ETUC AUSTERITY WATCH 2025 – 4th QUARTER 2025 ETUC AUSTERITY WATCH 2025 – SURVEY RESPONSES 6 October 2025 Countries: Austria Czech Republic France Finland Germany Greece Denmark Italy Norway Poland Romania Serbia Switzerland AUSTRIA (ÖGB) FISCAL MEASUREs: Austria’s budgetary situation is anything but easy. After two years of recession, Austria’s economy is currently in a state of stagnation. The previous government, consisting of the conservative ÖVP and the Greens, decided on numerous measures in times of crisis without any counter-financing and, in times of exceptionally high inflation, did not intervene in prices but distributed ineffective but highly costly one-off payments. Even aside from crisis spending, the previous government distributed very generous subsidies, especially to businesses. In 2020 and 2021, Austria paid the highest amount of business subsidies as a percentage of GDP among all EU member states. The reduction of the corporate tax rate from 25 to 23 percent also has a lasting impact on budget revenues. All of this ultimately led to an excessive deficit procedure. With the reinstatement of European fiscal rules in 2024, EU countries with high public debt or excessive deficits must set out measures in a so-called fiscal structural plan to reduce the budget deficit towards a balanced budget and the public debt ratio towards 60% within a certain period of time. Austria’s public finances have spiralled out of control: in 2024, Austria’s deficit ratio rose to 4.7% and its debt ratio to 81.8%. The current government, which has been in office since March 2025 and consists of the ÖVP, Social Democrats (SPÖ) and Liberals (NEOS), is therefore facing major challenges and, due to the EU fiscal rules but also against the backdrop of rising interest burdens, is required to implement extensive consolidation measures. Table 1: Volume of (planned) consolidation and offensive measures from 2025 to 2029 (in billion euros) 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Expenditure cuts 5,0 6,7 9,3 10,8 11,9 Revenue increases 2,0 3,6 3,7 4,1 4,6 Total consolidation measures 7,0 10,3 13,0 14,9 16,5 Offensive measures 0,6 1,6 1,8 1,8 1,8 Net consolidation 6,4 8,8 11,2 13,1 14,6 Net consolidation (% of GDP) 1,25% 1,65% 2,05% 2,32% 2,52% On average over the years, approximately 70% of the total restructuring consists of spending cuts. The volume of consolidation in the final year of the government’s term (2029) amounts to approximately two and a half per cent of GDP. It is also worth noting that parts of the austerity package originate from the ultimately failed government negotiations between the ÖVP and the far-right FPÖ which took place in the beginning of 2025. The current government decided to implement more revenue increasing measures and to redistribute the burden ENVIROMENTAL MEASURES: Abolition of the climate bonus The previous government introduced both a CO2 tax on fossil fuels and compensation payments (climate bonus) to households to offset the costs incurred by the tax. The so-called climate bonus consisted of an annual payment of €145 to €290 (depending on the location of residence) per person and was last paid out in 2024. The austerity package provides for its abolition, which means that households will now feel the full burden of the additional costs resulting from the CO2 tax. The abolition of the climate bonus comes down to a regressive tax increase. Through our efforts in the coalition negotiations at least commuters will be partially compensated for these additional costs through an increase in the commuter allowance. Households that use fossil fuels for heating, and in particular tenants who cannot choose their heating system, will suffer from the abolition of the climate bonus. Reduction in subsidies This affects savings in the Climate and Energy Fund, subsidies in the field of e-mobility and savings in the renovation offensive. SOCIAL MEASURES: Cuts in family benefits There are also real cuts in family benefits. For example, the child tax credit, family allowance and childcare allowance will not be adjusted for inflation for the calendar years 2026 and 2027. This confirms fears that the numerous reductions in employer contributions to the welfare state in recent years will lead to cuts in family benefits. Savings in federal ministries, especially in administration The ministries must save 15 per cent in material expenses (excluding rent). This is expected to save €1.1 billion in 2025 and €1.3 billion in 2026. Some of the savings will be achieved by reducing advertising expenditure, printing costs and business travel. In some cases, however, staff recruitment will be postponed or projects will be implemented on a reduced scale. In addition, some subsidies will be cut or discontinued altogether. According to the budget report, many ministries have already implemented cost-cutting measures since the beginning of the year and further savings in the area of human resources are to be worked out with “due consideration for job security and in consultation with the public service union”. Suspension of one third of compensation for bracket creep The previous government put an end to bracket creep by adjusting two-thirds of the income tax brackets to inflation. The remaining third of the additional government revenue from bracket creep was to be compensated to taxpayers through measures to be decided annually, such as, most recently, a child allowance for low-income single parents. This “political third” of the compensation is now being abolished, which is particularly problematic because the government thereby restricts its scope for action in the future. Abolition of educational leave The abolition of this further education model is expected to generate €650 million per year, and a much less comprehensive successor model is currently being worked on. Measures relating to pensions Austria’s pension system is based on the pay-as-you-go principle. Despite massive pressure, an increase in the statutory retirement age was prevented. Instead, measures are being taken to increase the actual retirement age, such as increasing the number of years of insurance required to be able to retire earlier (with reductions). Additionally, the contribution of pensioners (employee-side contribution) to health insurance was increased. The governing parties have also agreed on a social gradation of pension increases for the coming year. Senior citizens with a pension of up to €2,500 will receive the full inflation adjustment of 2.7 per cent. This affects 71.4 per cent of all senior citizens with a statutory pension, i.e. 1.65 million people. Pensioners with a pension of €2,500 or more will receive a fixed amount of €67.5 (2.7 per cent of €2,500). Other critical measures in the austerity package include: the elimination of the possibility for unemployed people to earn additional income (an exception is being considered for the long-term unemployed) a gradual price increase for the “Klimaticket” (i.e. the Austrian annual ticket for public transport) of around €200 in total (from €1,179.30 at present to around €1,400 from January 2026). The price increases are to be implemented gradually in autumn 2025 and January 2026. Increases in various fees (including for passports) and increases in health insurance contributions for pensioners SOME POSITIVE MEASURES In general, revenue increasing measures are preferable to spending cuts, especially in times of a recession, due to different fiscal multipliers. Therefore, it is positive, that the current government implemented more revenue increasing measures than initially planned, in particular if the revenue increase comes from the affluent segment of the population. The bank levy will be increased significantly for 2025 and 2026 and then moderately thereafter, energy companies will make yearly restructuring contributions of €200 million until 2029, foundation taxes will be raised, larger real estate deals will be taxed more heavily, and the top tax rate for incomes over €1 million per year will be extended. The ÖGB expressly welcomes these points. However, further revenue-side measures such as an increase in corporate tax and the introduction of a wealth and inheritance tax would be necessary. CZECH REPUBLIC (Trade union – Health care and social service) BUDGETARY/FISCAL measure: Planned/announced The government has currently prepared a draft state budget for 2026t /SR, which has not been discussed with the trade unions. The government is cutting public spending, reducing expenditure on the running of central government bodies, social services, and public health authorities indirectly, through public health insurance, it is cutting expenditure by healthcare providers. The government has not yet decided on adjustments to the pay scales of employees in public services and administration; the draft proposes a certain increase, but it is not known whether the funds will be provided from the state budget Trade unions are demanding an increase in funding to raise the salaries of public service and administration employees; trade unions disagree with cuts to public funding. In the Czech Republic, the Economic and Social Agreement Council meets and “negotiates,” but the demands of the trade unions are not being met. ECONOMIC measure: Planned/announced The government is investing in transport infrastructure/transport is congested, slow, making it difficult for employees and companies to get around reforms in education/lack of places in schools, problems placing students in secondary schools labor market flexibility/part-time jobs, job sharing, working from home Digitization in public services/slow Introduction of a single monthly employer report, a measure that should lead to simplified administration and increased work efficiency, data on employees and their benefits will be VERY detailed, to be launched on July 1, 2026 Brief explanation of why this measure affects the rights/law/interests of workers: In the Czech Republic, there is an increase in energy prices, expensive housing/shortage of apartments, shortage of places for education Trade unions demand sufficient apartments, schools, quality health and social care Is there or is there not a dialogue with the government about the announced austerity measure? Formal dialogue yes, measures proposed by trade unions are not being implemented SOCIAL measure: Planned/announced Social support, unemployment benefits, and care allowances are provided in the Czech Republic. They have an impact because of employee security. OSPOD – Social and Legal Protection of Children Authority, whose task is to protect the rights and interests of children and ensure their favorable development and upbringing. OSPOD intervenes in cases where children are at risk, such as neglect, abuse, maltreatment, or domestic violence, and can, for example, arrange adoptions or help resolve family situations. Trade unions are demanding financial support to increase social benefits, especially for single mothers, disabled people, and pensioners. In the Czech Republic, some families cannot send their children to extracurricular activities, which puts them at risk of social exclusion. Is there or is there not a dialogue with the government about the reported austerity measures? There is a dialogue, but again, it is not respected. FRANCE (Fédération Interco CFDT) BUDGETARY/FISCAL measure: Adopted/under implementation Pour les services publics, il y a une réduction des dotations de l’Etat envers les collectivités territoriales. Certains départements et grosses collectivités mettent en place des plans sociaux pour se séparer d’une partie des agents et réduisent une part importante des services aux populations. Notre fédération forme les équipes syndicales des fonctions publiques à réagir à un plan social, comme cela se fait dans le privé en leur expliquant comment s’appuyer sur le droit public français pour lutter, et comment accompagner les agents concernés. La CFDT a appelé à la manifestation intersyndicale du 18 septembre, qui a réuni un million de manifestants, contre les politiques d’austérité, avec un ultimatum donné au nouveau premier ministre français. (Au moment de répondre au questionnaire, le premier ministre n’a pas encore constitué de nouveau gouvernement en France) Description of the SOCIAL measure : Déjà appliquée : réforme des retraites avec report de 2 ans de l’âge de départ en retraite. En cours d’application : Une réforme des droits au chômage, qui réduit encore plus les droits des demandeurs d’emploi. Introduction d’un 2e jour de carence en cas d’arrêt maladie dans la fonction publique. Projet annulé par le nouveau premier ministre : suppression de 2 jours fériés. La CFDT conteste devant le conseil d’Etat les nouvelles mesures de réforme du chômage qui ne respectent pas les règles paritaires du dialogue social La CFDT a participé à la manifestation intersyndicale du 18 septembre, qui a réuni un million de manifestants, contre les politiques d’austérité, avec un ultimatum donné au nouveau premier ministre français sur un budget plus social que celui proposé par le premier ministre et le gouvernement démissionnaire. ENVIRONMENTAL measure: Adopted/under implementation Description of the ENVIRONMENTAL measure : Les réductions de budget et la politique d’austérité entraine un recul des aides pour la rénovation énergétique. La loi Duplomb pour l’agriculture relance le soutien à l’agriculture intensive au détriment d’une agriculture plus durable (Stockage de l’eau dans des méga-bassines, agrandissement des élevages intensifs, baisse des pouvoirs de contrôle de la police de l’environnement). La politique énergétique de la France reste celle de privilégier l’investissement dans l’énergie nucléaire plutôt que dans les énergies renouvelables. Contre la loi Duplomb, la CFDT a appelé à la signature d’une pétition nationale. Le Conseil Constitutionnel a supprimé de cette loi la réintroduction de pesticides de type néocotinoïdes. FINLAND (SAK) BUDGETARY/FISCAL measure: Adopted/under implementation. In the spring 2025, the right-wing government decided to decrease the corporate tax and the income tax. Due to other changes in the tax system, the income tax cut does not benefit low- and middle-income classes, but only the wealthiest individuals. These measures undermine the tax revenue annually by approximately two billion euros (0,8 % of GDP) with only marginal positive effects on growth. In the fall of 2025, the right-wing government decided to consolidate public finances by additional 1 billion euros, likely due to underestimation of the adverse effects of tax cuts. Majority of the consolidation to the year 2027 to make it look like the government achieved at balancing the public finance before the next elections. To mitigate the deficit of the tax cuts, the government decided in the spring to cut e.g. from public governance and public services, NGOs and education. Additionally, the government intends to use the wealth of pension funds to finance the growing public deficits. To further consolidate the public deficit by 1 billion euros, the government decided to take more money from pension funds and to cut from e.g. social housing, migration, public governance and R&D. Most trade unions along with non-partisan researchers and experts have been appalled by these unjust and ideological policies. These decisions undermine public finances and further increase inequality and poverty in Finland. The government has not been willing to engage in meaningful dialogue over these policies, nor have they listened to the scholars and experts who have been vocal in the criticism. ECONOMIC measure: Adopted/under implementation. Over the year 2025, the right-wing government has decided to cut public governance and services substantially, consume over a billion euros from the funding of future pensions and to decrease the funding of social housing to approximately ¼ of its earlier level. In addition to previous limitations to the rights to strike, in spring 2025 the government undermined further the bargaining power of trade unions by removing the tax deductibility of trade union membership fees. The need of social housing will only grow due to the austerity policies, including unprecedented cuts to social security and unemployment benefits. The public sector cuts are certain to lead to lay-offs and decrease in availability and quality of public services. The exclusion of the tax deductibility of trade union membership fees is likely to have an adverse effect on the collective bargaining coverage. Trade unions have been opposing the government’s policies and provided policy options – that have been disregarded, unfortunately. The government has not been willing to engage in meaningful dialogue with the trade unions. ENVIRONMENTAL measure: Adopted/under implementation . Measures: Disengagement from just transition measures – Adopted removal of adult education support totally 120 milj. euro cuts on higher education which was targeted especially to adults learning reduction of earning related daily unemployment allowance up to 25% focusing the JTF measures only to regions where is active peat energy production. Minimal social criterias to green transition investments required when supported by EU or national funds. Reviewing and diminishing existing standards or preventing new ones to be adopted – Under implementation Under public procurement legislation revision the mandatory exclusion criteria are being loosened regarding labour law violations. Under current law the employers need to show the criminal record extract for proof. In the future their written word being clean will be enough. The reasoning for change: lessening the administrative burden to both administrator and to employers. There are many other changes planned also under public procurement eg. tightening the in-house rules so that in the future it is much harder for municipalities to keep their own public services. Legislative changes have been commented to the MoEE so far and are expected to be in the parliament the end of year. Delaying energy and climate reforms (as in national plans) Austerity measures can also be identified through to their effects – Adopted/under implementation Finland is up-dating both its mid-term climate policy strategy (effort-sharing-sectors) and energy- and climate strategy (ETS and LULUCF-sectors). They are not ambitious enough to guarantee that Finland will reach EU2035 targets of LULUCF and effort sharing sector (50% reduction after 2005). In general, Finland’s net emissions have not decreased much between 2005 and 2024. In terms of emissions, annual emissions have been 50.7 Mt CO2-eq. In 2024 they were 52.3 Mt CO2-eq. Although the emission cap sector has been decreasing faster than EU obligations, the poor overall development is due to the land use sector, which changed from a carbon sink to an emitter in 2018. According to the Natural Resources Institute Finland (LUKE), Finnish forests also changed to an emitter in 2021. The net emissions of the land use sector in 2024 were 13.5 Mt CO2-eq. Finland would have a deficit of up to 110 – 115 Mt CO2-eq for the first EU LULUCF obligation period 2021-2025. Even if the forest land flexibility (22 Mt CO2-2kv) and Finland’s separate flexibility (5 Mt CO2-eq) were used, there would still be a deficit of approximately 84 Mt CO2-eq. Even with these assumptions, the deficit for 2026-2029 would be large: 42.5 Mt CO2-eq. Even knowing this all, the Government has decided not to restict logging in Finland and proposes measures cutting co2-eq in LULUCF-sector only worth app. 3-4 Mt CO2-2q. There is also worrying development in the effort-sharing sector, particularly due to the transport sector, whose emissions in 2024 increased by 0.3 Mt CO2-eq from 2023. The government latest decisions have led to additional emissions in the transport sector should be reversed immediately. These include moderating the bio-part of the distribution obligation, including transport electricity in the distribution obligation without increasing the obligation level, a flexibility mechanism for the distribution obligation, reducing fuel tax, reducing vehicle tax for high-emission cars, and increasing VAT on public transport from 10 percent to 14 percent. Also, in the 2026 state budget 50 million euros was cut from the clean transition aid schemes for the companies (mainly regarding CCS projects). GERMANY (DGB) BUDGETARY/FISCAL measure: Planned/announced. The fiscal situation in Germany is more favourable than in many other European countries. The German government has decided to implement a large off-budget instrument of 500 billion € to be spent for infrastructure in the next 12 years, thereby responding to a key demand of German trade unions. In addition, an exemption from national fiscal rules has been established for defence spending and civil security above one per cent of GDP. In July 2025 the German government has delivered the long-awaited fiscal-structural plan (FSP) to the European Commission. Apparently, the medium term budgetary plan of the German government is in conformity with the EU fiscal rules thanks to a very flexible interpretation of the new EU fiscal framework and some adjustments to the Debt Sustainability Analysis. The German FSP assumes a higher increase of the GDP potential than the technical trajectory proposed by the COM and the deactivation of the so-called safeguards in the regulation that aim at a linear consolidation effort. Consolidation efforts have been postponed to the later years of the 7-year adjustment period. Despite the large off-budget investment instrument of 500 billion €, budgetary cuts are foreseen for the German federal budget 2026 in the following fields: Social welfare Cuts in the means-tested basic income support for jobseekers (so-called Bürgergeld) Cuts in the federal contributions to the public pension scheme (interessanterweise hat die KOM ja genau das in den länderspezifischen Empfehlungen in diesem Jahr empfohlen, Ingo hat sich ordentlich gezofft mit der KOM) Education Cuts in Germany’s federal student financial aid program, providing means-tested grants and low-interest loans to support students’ living and education costs (so-called Bafög) Cust in funding programmes to improve digitalisation in schools (Digitalpakt) Energy/Industry Cuts to funding programs for completing the energy transition in the building sector.” Cuts in funding programmes for the decarbonisation of the industry (e.g. the carbon contracts for difference) and the scale-up of the hydrogen economy. International development reductions in government spending on international development cooperation, including cuts for political foundations. Administration Reduction of staff in public administration by 8% in four years Overall, the consolidation efforts will significantly increase in the medium term: According to the federal government’s budget planning, there is a cumulative budget gap of €172 billion until 2029. Key trade union demands: wealth related tax reforms to increase state revenues in the medium term (a wealth levy, wealth tax, inheritance tax reform further reform of the German debt break in favour of public investments Dialogue btw government and trade unions: We have not been given the possibility to comment on the German fiscal-structural plan. As far as the budget 2026 is concerned we have adopted a very detailed position and are in contact with several MP in the legislative process. The government does not envisage a participatory process for the budget. ECONOMIC measure: Planned/announced a) for employees beyond the standard retirement age the possibility to hire under a fixed-term contract has been extended b) Extension of short-term employment exempt from social security contributions from 70 to 90 working days for seasonal workers Trade union reaction: to a) This is a step in the completely wrong direction: the option of fixed-term employment without objective justification must be abolished entirely and for all age groups. Through this unjustified possibility of fixed-term employment, employers and public authorities are effectively enabled by law to undermine and circumvent protection against dismissal. to b) The DGB strongly rejects the proposed legislation. This legislation will further entrench an already precarious employment situation in the labour market. Those affected are predominantly employees working in agriculture, most of whom come from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and whose working conditions are already characterised by uncertain incomes, high physical strain and inadequate health insurance coverage. GREECE (GSEE ) BUDGETARY/FISCAL measure: Adopted/under implementation MEASURE: Targeting high primary surpluses & restrictive fiscal stance. The 2025 State Budget is predicated on the permanent achievement of primary surpluses (approx. 2.5% of GDP), together with a strict expenditure path and constraints on new spending initiatives. GSEE assessment: The combination of (a) sustained public primary surpluses supported by increased revenues, (b) stagnant real wages, and (c) a fragile private balance sheet creates a pattern of “private austerity”: reduced liquidity for consumption/investment, greater exposure to borrowing or negative saving, and, consequently, a contraction of domestic demand and of wage margins. This is the channel through which high primary surpluses shift the burden to the private sector. Lack of tripartite dialogue. MEASURE: Gradual zeroing of horizontal electricity subsidies. The government terminated horizontal electricity tariffs/subsidies as of 12/2023–2024, maintaining only targeted support for vulnerable groups. The impact is that it Increases the net energy expenditure of households and SMEs, compressing the disposable income of wage earners and small professionals. GSEE does not endorse the early withdrawal of horizontal subsidies without sufficient price de-escalation and without strengthening targeted measures and regulatory safeguards—due to the risk for disposable income and for poverty/energy poverty. Lack of tripartite dialogue. ECONOMIC measure: Planned/announced MEASURE: Promoted privatisations/asset concessions of ports & infrastructures. Calls for tenders/asset exploitation plans for Greek ports and continuation of privatisation/concession schemes for regional infrastructures. It alters the terms of provision of services of general interest; risk of increases in fees/prices and upending of labour relations in port activities. GSEE advocates maintaining the public character with full and stable employment—supports the mobilisation of workers in response to the relevant policies and highlights risks for service quality and for working conditions. SOCIAL measure: MEASURE — Law 5053/2023 (labour): six-day work, “flexibility,” — Adopted/in force from 2024.It permits work on a sixth day in sectors operating on a five-day basis; provides for working-time arrangements; allows parallel employment up to 13 hours/day (in 2 employers); simplifies dismissals in the first 12 months, etc. GSEE position is that these measures diminish protections on working time/rest and strengthen individual arrangements over collective ones—aggravation of precariousness. Calls for withdrawal/amendment of key articles and for the restoration of collective bargaining/agreements. Lack of tripartite dialogue. MEASURE — “Fair Work for All: Simplification of Legislation – Support for the Worker – Protection in Practice” (Ministry of Labour, 2025) — Planned/announced. A Draft law simplifies declarations in ERGANI II (Greece’s national online employment information system, operated by the Ministry of Labour) and promotes zero-hour contracts; regulates overtime; extends employment up to 13 hours/day (in 1 employer). Impact: expanding daily working time and flexibilising overtime shift regulation from the collective to the individual level, increasing risks of overwork and bargaining asymmetry; reducing bureaucracy without adequate inspection safeguards, may further undermine the de facto protection of working time/rest. Lack of tripartite dialogue. GSEE denounces the withdrawal of provisions on working time (working-time “arrangements”/13 hours). Calls for a nationwide 24-hour strike (1/10/2025) demanding the withdrawal of the contentious provisions and a reduction of weekly hours (target 37.5 hours) as a basis for job quality, stressing that the promoted policy weakens collective regulation and increases precariousness. GSEE calls for the restoration of collective bargaining/agreements. ENVIRONMENTAL measure: Planned/announced Water/water-supply services: regulatory interventions & institutional changes : discussions on “regulating” the water supply/sewerage framework and the role of the relevant authorities. It brings risks of tariff hikes/quality deterioration in services; indirect burdens on households; employment uncertainty/ precariousness in water-supply operators. GSEE takes an explicit stance for the public character of water: “Water is a public good and we will not allow it to be turned into a commodity” — opposition to regulations that may result in de facto privatisation. DENMARK (HK Stat) BUDGETARY/FISCAL measure: Adopted/under implementation In the state sector, the 2025 Finance Act included a cut of 1,000 full-time equivalent positions in state administration. In the draft Finance Act for 2026, it is stated that the state must save DKK 5.5 billion on administration by 2030, starting with DKK 800 million in 2026. In addition, roughly half of state workplaces are subject to a so-called reallocation contribution, which reduces operating budgets by 2 percent each year. In the municipal sector, there must also be significant savings on administration and job centres. Alongside these cutbacks, however, the public sector is also allocated additional funds for defence, safety, and security. ENVIRONMENTAL measure: Adopted/under implementation. Government authorities in the areas of climate, energy, green transition, nature restoration, etc. are subject to spending cuts, even though funds are allocated to these purposes with the other hand. ITALY (Unione Italiana Lavoratori) BUDGETARY/FISCAL measure: Adopted/under implementation The 2025 Budget Law imposed stricter deficit targets with cuts in health, local authority budgets, and hiring freezes in public administration. One striking reduction in social spending was in the area of public pensions, where the inflation adjustment mechanism determined cuts for pensioners with pension allowances above certain thresholds (around 2.394,84 euro monthly). In the same matter, early retirement has been deeply penalized (Quota 103, Opzione donna, Ape sociale) by reducing the amount of the allowances up to less 30%. These measures deeply affect workers as they make the ordinary retirement by fulfilling the retirement age condition the only viable solution to avoid losing a great deal of their accumulated pensions, binding them to stay at work longer and preventing a necessary turnover in the public administration. UIL has strongly advocated against those measures requesting a dialogue with the government to amplify flexible options for retirement and guarantee adequate pensions for workers. This dialogue on pensions has froze for over two years and no space for discussion is available at the moment. ECONOMIC measure: Planned/announced The government announced in 2024 the intention to sell a further ~29.26% of its shares in Poste Italiane, the Italian post office company which has been already partially privatised, between 2025-2027, reducing state ownership while keeping a minority stake. This measure has been momentarily put on halt. Financial analysis of Poste Italiane shows how the company is solid and generates dividends every year, at the benefit of the stocks held by the State. UIL argues that Poste Italiane is a crucial public service with social functions—ensuring accessibility (especially in rural/remote areas), universal delivery, and service to elderly or low-density communities—that could be undermined by profit-driven models. Uil, through its sectorial representation, has been deeply critical of this measure and has highlighted the lack of a serious dialogue with trade unions, showing concerns relative to the safekeeping of jobs and the risks of leaving such an important company in the hands of private actors. SOCIAL measure: Adopted/under implementation Recent social policy changes—such as replacing the Citizenship Income with the Inclusion Allowance (ADI)—have hurt many low-income households, depriving Italy from having an universal minimum income scheme. The new ADI is a sectorial measure, aimed only at households with certain conditions, narrowing eligibility and reducing support for many unemployed and poor households. ISTAT (2025) confirms that ADI, combined with tax reforms, had limited impact on equity, with the Gini index worsening slightly (30.25 → 30.40). Poverty risk reached 23.1% of population. Many who previously received RdC are excluded from ADI (e.g. single adults without children, precarious workers). The measure disproportionately affects southern regions and vulnerable groups, such as immigrant household, worsening material deprivation and access to basic rights. By cutting income support without strengthening active labour policies, ADI leaves precarious and long-term unemployed workers without adequate protection. the government has proceeded largely unilaterally, ignoring union proposals for a broader, more inclusive welfare design. UIL strongly opposes the dismantling of RdC, and it demands the restoration of a universal minimum income scheme ensuring coverage for all in poverty, not just restricted categories, as well as proper integration of ADI with real active labour market policies, training, and personalized support. The government has proceeded largely unilaterally, ignoring union proposals for a broader, more inclusive welfare design (CISL) Description of the BUDGETARY/FISCAL measure : Excessively prudent fiscal policies At the request of the CISL, measures to reduce the tax burden on low and middle incomes have been made structural and adequately financed. According to the Parliamentary Budget Office the reduction of the tax wedge is one of the measures that improve economic well-being and help to reduce net income inequality. The CISL believes that further steps need to be taken to further reduce inequality and increase wages and pensions. There are categories that are structurally more exposed to the risk of poverty among the employed: foreigners (22.6%), single people (12.7%) and couples with three or more children (21.7%) Adequate investment and increased public spending are needed to address the digital, green and demographic transitions already underway in our societies in a fair manner; this is, in fact, prevented by the current European Stability and Growth Pact, which needs to be radically reformed. – Disposal of public infrastructure or state assets of social interest: one disposal that raises concerns is the sale by TIM of NetCo (telephone network) to KKR (American investment fund) on 1 July 2024 (transfer of the fixed network and wholesale activities to FiberCop and subsequent acquisition of FiberCop by a KKR company) – Pursuit of public debt cuts at the expense of investment and growth: the implementation of the rules of the new European Stability and Growth Pact could lead to a contraction in support for investment and growth, also due to the phasing out of the Next Generation EU programme. Reduction in social spending: according to ISTAT, social spending/GDP has remained high over the last five years, but is expected to decline slightly in 2023 after peaking during the pandemic. – Introduction of non-progressive tax reforms: the CISL does not agree with the flat tax planned for self-employed workers. ECONOMIC measure: Reduction in the quantity or quality of public services. CISL union is concerned about the future of public healthcare. Some data released by ISTAT suggest that we are seeing the first signs of a decline. One cause for concern is the decrease in the number of hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants in the decade 2010-2020 (from 4.1 to 3.9 per 1,000), which is an indicator of a contraction in hospital provision (albeit with regional differences). The Court of Auditors also points to critical issues in the measures taken to reduce post-Covid waiting lists, indicating that the interventions have not produced decisive and uniform results; at the same time, there has been an increase between 2022 and 2023 in the number of people giving up due to waiting lists and economic reasons. Furthermore, in 2024, approximately 1 in 10 people (9.9%) gave up specialist visits/examinations; the main cause was waiting lists (6.8%), followed by costs (5.3%). This is a deterioration compared to 2023 (7.6%) and 2019 (6.3%). Local public transport is also a cause for concern: ISTAT reports a certain decline in supply in provincial capitals (seats-km per inhabitant) and even more marked disparities in the South. Many companies in the sector in the South are in deep financial crisis and unable to provide an acceptable level of service. Finally, there is a pressing need for investment in water infrastructure. Water losses during the supply phase average 41.8% and 17.9 m³/km/day: although these indicators show a slight improvement on 2016, they point to structural problems in service quality (continuity, losses), with performance once again worse in the South. – Liberalisation of market sectors or suboptimal regulation of strategic economic sectors: as is well known, Italy lags behind in various areas of liberalisation. Where privatisation has taken place, it has not always had a positive impact on workers and consumers. In this regard, it is worth noting the recent intervention by the Competition Authority, which imposed a maximum fine of over €936 million on six oil companies for restrictive agreements on the “bio component” of fuel prices. SOCIAL measure : Wage moderation, including cuts or freezes in civil servants’ salaries. To date, real wages have not yet returned to the levels seen at the beginning of 2021.The 2025–27 negotiation cycle is expected to be completed, which will make additional resources available to civil servants and bring the negotiation cycle back to normal. Both inflation on frequently purchased goods (which is about double the average) and the phenomenon of fiscal drainage, which has eroded part (or more than all, for many) of the benefits of IRPEF reforms and contractual increases, have had a net negative effect on real income, especially for employees and pensioners. Inhibition of collective bargaining, particularly at sectoral or multi-employer level: there is no inhibition of collective bargaining. Rather, there is a political desire to interfere in the setting of wages both through hard measures (the setting of a legal minimum wage) and through soft measures. Reduction of public pensions and solidarity in the public pension pillar: thanks in part to the action of the CISL trade union over the last three years, pension equalisation has been “secured” on a technical level and is now more targeted towards low pensions. The 2025 Budget Law also provided for an additional increase for pensions equal to or below the minimum pension: +2.2% in 2025 (and +1.3% in 2026), in addition to the ordinary indexation. This is a “qualitative” improvement because it concentrates resources on the lowest pensions Reduction in subsidies and income protection for people in need: in 2024, the citizen’s income (Rdc) was replaced by two measures introduced by Decree Law 48/2023: the inclusion allowance (ADI) and support for training and work (SFL). The numerical coverage of transfers has been reduced compared to the RdC, a sign of a more selective and categorical system; at the same time, there is a growing emphasis on active policies, which are still weak in Italy. It is also essential that the public-private network of employment services works in close coordination with social and health services given that many long-term unemployed people are highly marginalised and psychologically and socially fragile. Reforms of labour law, social security and social protection: there have been no structural changes in labour market regulation. Attempts have been made to adequately regulate fixed-term contracts, strengthening the role of collective bargaining in defining the types of employment covered by such contracts. Thanks to the PNRR, large-scale active policies have been trialed in Italy for the first time. However, there is a lack of monitoring of the impact of this major experiment which is being managed by the regions in a patchy manner. Replacement of stable jobs with precarious forms of employment: In 2023, the incidence of fixed-term employees on the total workforce will fall to 16.0% (–0.8 p.p. vs 2022), while in the second quarter of 2025, fixed-term employees will decrease further (–7.7% year-on-year) compared to the growth in permanent employees (+1.9%). Flow data confirm that there is no increase in precarious employment; on the contrary, conversions to permanent contracts are on the rise and temporary work is also declining. ENVIRONMENTAL measure : Concerning disengagement from fair transition measures, revision and reduction of existing standards or impediment to the adoption of new standards and Delay in energy and climate reforms: this is a European issue, not just a national one. The measures envisaged by the EU have been poorly designed and are difficult to implement, with effects on production and employment. NORWAY (AVYO Vocation Union for Work and Welfare employees) BUDGETARY/FISCAL measure: Planned/announced Our members are welfare workers employed by The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Service. Our elected representatives nationally and also locally help decide how the budgets is allocated. It has been political decided that less money will be allocated to the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Service. ENVIRONMENTAL: Planned/announced: The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Service plans to implement climate accounting on all levels. POLAND (OPZZ) BUDGETARY/FISCAL measure: Adopted/under implementation In 2024, the government decided that the wage growth rate in the public sector in 2025 would be at the level of the projected inflation rate of 105.0%. The base wages for individual positions in the public sector were set at the same growth rate. The government’s decision was made during the work on the budget bill, despite opposition from trade unions, which demanded a wage increase in the public sector of at least 15%. If the inflation forecast for this year is confirmed, this means in practice that there will be no real wage increases for public sector employees this year. In 2025, the government repeated the above solution, setting a growth rate of 103.0% in the draft budget bill for 2026, i.e., at the level of the forecast inflation rate (103.0%). It set the base salaries for individual positions in the public sector at the same level. Trade unions demanded a wage increase in the public sector of at least 12%. If the inflation forecast is realized, it will again mean no real wage increases for public sector employees in 2026. For the first time in the history of the Social Dialogue Council, trade unions and employers’ organizations adopted a joint position on the remuneration of public sector employees, indicating that the wage increase proposed by the government was too low and demanding a higher wage increase in the public sector. However, the government ignored the joint voice of the trade unions and employers. In our opinion, this is a case of budget savings at the expense of the pay conditions of public sector employees. The government also rejected the proposal of the trade union side of the Social Dialogue Council on the increase in the minimum wage for 2026 (by 7.48%) and set the increase in this category of remuneration at the statutory level (by 3%), i.e., the projected inflation rate. The level of the minimum wage affects state budget expenditure, including on the wages of employees receiving this category of remuneration. This will mean no real wage growth for minimum wage earners. From January 1, 2026, it will amount to PLN 4,806 (approx. EUR 1,118), and thus will increase by PLN 140 gross (approx. EUR 32.5), or only PLN 95 net (approx. EUR 22.10). The ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage will also deteriorate in the following year, from 52.7% in 2025 to 50.5% in 2026. The government has not planned any changes to the tax system (the main parameters of personal income tax – tax thresholds and rates, the amount of the tax-free allowance, and employee income-related expenses) for the following year. This means an increase in the effective tax rate, mainly on income from work, and in the tax burden on citizens. OPZZ has been calling for systemic changes to the tax system for years in order to make it fairer. ROMANIA (BNS) SOCIAL MEASURES: Obstruction of the right to collective bargaining through legislative instruments adopted by the Government. Through Emergency Ordinance No. 156/2024 on fiscal and budgetary measures, the Government made the conclusion of collective labour agreements (CLAs) at state-owned companies conditional on the prior approval of their budgets: „Article 12. – (1) By way of derogation from the provisions of article 971 of Law No. 367/2022 on social dialogue, collective labour agreements shall be negotiated, under the conditions of the law, after the approval of the revenue and expenditure budgets of economic operators, within the limits and under the conditions established by the budgets.” In fact, the Government delays the adoption of these budgets until the end of the year, thus blocking the negotiation process for the entire current year. There are presently numerous national companies and commercial companies with majority state capital that still do not have approved budgets, which paralyzes the right to collective bargaining guaranteed by the ILO Conventions ratified by Romania, and Directive (EU) 2022/2041 on adequate minimum wages. Collective bargaining is mandatory at the level of units with at least 10 employees/workers, as well as at the level of collective bargaining sectors. For example, the budget for the National Road Infrastructure Administration Company SA hasn’t been adopted yet, with the last one being from May 31, 2024. Furthermore, neither the National Waterways Administration Company S.A. nor the companies in the defence industry have had their budgets approved to date, which is all the more serious given the current geopolitical context. This makes it impossible to start the collective bargaining process precisely because of the lack of budget approval, which is equivalent to a deliberate blockage of the process. This practice is not merely a postponement of negotiations by a few days, but a concrete restriction of a fundamental right of employees to collective bargaining for several months. Given that collective bargaining cannot, in any case, lead to the approved budget limits being exceeded, making the start of negotiations conditional on the approval of the budget adds an unjustified obstacle. This creates discrimination against employees in companies with majority state capital, who are subject to an additional condition for exercising their right to negotiate – a condition that does not exist for other employees in the national economy. Deliberate delay of the national action plan to promote collective bargaining. Although the adoption of this plan is a direct obligation under Article 4(2) of Directive (EU) 2022/20412 on adequate minimum wages in the European Union, the draft has been delayed for more than a year under the pretext of obtaining opinions from various ministries. Tripartite negotiations on the content of the plan were essentially concluded in February 2025, but since then the government as repeatedly postponed its adoption, citing endless bureaucratic procedures for collecting interministerial opinions. This attitude contrasts sharply with the speed with which the other provisions of the directive were transposed: Law No. 283/2024, which introduced amendments to the Labor Code, and Government Decision No. 35/2025 on establishing the procedure for updating the minimum wage have already been adopted. It appears that everything related to social dialogue and, in particular, the essential component concerning the promotion of collective bargaining and the national action plan, is treated by the Government as a secondary issue, without any real priority. This delay is all the more serious given that Romania currently has an extremely low level of collective bargaining coverage, at around 12%, which is well below the European average and incomparable with the 80% coverage target set by the directive. Instead of being an absolute priority, the plan is being postponed indefinitely, which demonstrates a lack of political will to create a framework conducive to collective bargaining. It is clear that the government does not treat this instrument as an essential public policy measure for promoting a decent standard of living for citizens, as enshrined in Directive (EU) 2022/2041, but as a last-minute bureaucratic obligation, even though its role is precisely to ensure sustainable growth in living standards. The government’s refusal to set an example in promoting collective bargaining In the trade union proposals for the development of the national action plan for the promotion of collective bargaining, as provided for in Directive (EU) 2022/2041 on adequate minimum wages in the European Union, we explicitly requested that the state take on a role model function by mandating its representatives in national companies to initiate collective bargaining. Furthermore, we formulated concrete proposals to amend and supplement the plan, arguing that in commercial companies and companies in which the Romanian state is a shareholder or partner (regardless of the percentage of shares held), as well as in public institutions, state representatives on boards of directors or heads of public institutions should be mandated to propose, during board meetings, that the commercial company or company in question request the employers’ federation or confederation to which it is affiliated (entitled to participate in sectoral negotiations) to initiate or respond to the invitation to start negotiations at the collective bargaining sector level. In the case of public institutions, the mandate should include the obligation to initiate the procedures provided for by law for negotiation in the sector of activity to which the institution belongs. At the same time, we requested that the results of the fulfilment of these mandates be presented every six months to the representative social partners at the national level, within the framework of the social dialogue conducted at the ministry responsible for social dialogue. However, the government has not taken any measures in this regard. The situation at the National Company “Poșta Română” is emblematic of how the Government and the companies under its authority treat collective bargaining. Negotiations for a new collective labour agreement began at the request of the representative trade union organization, but the company’s management acted constantly to delay the process and exceed the legal deadlines. Thus, on August 13, 2025, the first negotiation meeting took place, during which the parties established the legal period of 45 days for conducting negotiations (according to Article 97(4) of Law No. 367/2022 on social dialogue), a period that was to expire on September 26, 2024. According to Article 97(4), this duration may only be exceeded with the agreement of the parties. The management’s behaviour revealed a clear intention to delay and undermine the negotiation process by imposing conditions that are contrary to the law. Furthermore, during the negotiations, the CEO sought to eliminate provisions that were essential to the union, particularly those concerning the rights of the union, and even invoked the restrictive provisions of Government Emergency Ordinance No. 156/2024 to reject the granting of bonuses and other salary rights, despite the fact that the company’s budget had already been approved in May 2025. Currently, the union’s demands have been almost entirely rejected, with management accepting only a few general provisions that have no real impact on workers’ rights. This practice constitutes a de facto denial of the right to collective bargaining, as the negotiations were formally opened but substantially emptied of content and devoid of purpose. Failure to transpose the Directive on pay transparency in the national legislation Although the deadline for transposing Directive (EU) 2023/970 is June 2026, Romania has not even started preliminary consultations with the social partners. This inaction confirms the lack of political will to implement mechanisms that strengthen workers’ rights and the role of trade unions. Romania urgently needs the principles promoted by this directive – equality, transparency, and protection of workers against wage discrimination – to be transposed into domestic law, as the current situation on the labour market highlights major imbalances and vulnerabilities. We have recently seen systematic and significant delays in the transposition of European directives, many of which are transposed at the last minute, in a purely formal exercise in which consultations with social partners are only simulated. We estimate that the same scenario will be repeated in the case of the Directive on wage transparency: the transposition texts will be drafted unilaterally by the Government, in a hurry, with obvious gaps, and the drafts will be sent to the social partners without sufficient time for analysis and without the possibility of formulating and supporting substantive amendments. Furthermore, under the pretext of the approaching transposition deadline, the government will invoke urgency and rush the bills through Parliament without allowing for real debate or accepting amendments. This recurring practice results not only in the inadequate transposition of European rules, but also in the neutralization of social dialogue, which is reduced to a mere formality, in blatant contradiction with the commitments made in the NRRP and with the fundamental principles of the European Union. Ignoring ILO requests and obstructing international cooperation In May 2024, the National Trade Union Bloc drafted and submitted an official complaint to the International Labor Organization (ILO), in which we reported serious anti-union actions taken against the Romanian Postal Workers’ Union (SLPR), a representative trade union within the National Company “Poșta Română,” by its general manager, Valentin Ștefan. The ILO confirmed receipt of the complaint and immediately intervened with the Romanian Government, reminding it of its obligations under Convention No. 98 on the right to organize and collective bargaining. In an official letter, the ILO stressed the importance of guaranteeing the independence of workers’ organizations from employers and asked the government to provide comments and concrete measures regarding the points raised in our communication. However, to date, the Romanian government has not responded to the ILO and has not taken any measures to remedy the situation. This silence amounts to a deliberate refusal to cooperate with international mechanisms for monitoring compliance with labour rights. Meanwhile, the conflict has worsened, with the company’s management continuing to adopt blatantly anti-union practices: – refusal to implement final court rulings requiring the company to resume the payment of union dues and comply with the collective bargaining agreement; – restructuring the company without consulting the union, including the elimination of jobs and subunits; – initiating abusive criminal proceedings against union leaders employed in the company’s subsidiaries, under the pretext of falsifying employees’ signatures for a strike; – intensifying the harassment campaign, including by limiting the union leader’s access to union members. All these actions are taking place despite repeated efforts by the BNS and the affiliated union, with no response from the national authorities, even after the change of government following the May 2025 elections. This results not only in a serious violation of trade union rights at the national level, but also in a defiant disregard for explicit requests from the ILO, which affects Romania’s credibility as a member state of the European Union and of international organizations specializing in labour issues. Systematic violation of the obligation to inform and consult employees Trade unions do not receive the data and information necessary for collective bargaining in a timely manner. Lack of access to fundamental documents – financial plans, performance reports, cost structures, economic forecasts – makes informed and genuine negotiation impossible, contravening not only Directive 2002/14/EC on informing and consulting workers, but also Law No. 467/2006 transposing it into national law. According to this law, the employer is compelled to provide workers’ representatives with the information necessary to analyse the economic and financial situation of the entity and to substantiate collective bargaining. The information must include at least data on the current financial situation and prospects for the contractual period, the structure and evolution of employment, measures concerning the organization of work and working hours, the protection of rights in the event of a transfer of the undertaking, and occupational health and safety measures. At the same time, according to Article 30(1) Decisions of the board of directors on these matters must be communicated in writing, within two working days, to trade unions or employee representatives. The decisions of the board of directors on these matters must be communicated in writing, within two working days, to the trade unions or employee representatives. Furthermore, Article 98(4) of the same law expressly provides that the information provided by the employer must allow for a complete analysis of the economic and financial situation and must include at least the data mentioned above. In practice, however, in many establishments these obligations are not complied with – the information is either not provided at all, or is provided with unjustified delays, is incomplete, or is provided in a form that does not allow for a real analysis. This situation directly affects the ability of trade unions to negotiate collective bargaining agreements effectively and fairly. Negotiations thus become formal, devoid of substance, and the union side is placed in a position of inferiority, without access to the same essential information available to the employer. As a result, the right to information and consultation, as an integral part of social dialogue, is rendered meaningless, in flagrant violation of both national legislation and European and international standards in this area. SERBIA (Confederation of Autonomous Trade Union of Serbia – CATUS) BUDGETARY/FISCAL measure: Adopted/under implementation Measure 1: Medium-term Fiscal Strategy / 2025–2028 fiscal path (Budgetary stance) The Draft Fiscal Strategy keeps the fiscal stance close to the recent practice: a planned general-government deficit around 3% of GDP in 2025–2027, with public debt forecast to stabilise but remaining above pre-pandemic targets. Budget priorities determine public wages, social transfers, health and education funding. A persistent high deficit in combination with weak fiscal rules leaves room for future sharp consolidation that typically targets wages, hiring freezes, or cuts in social spending — directly affecting workers’ incomes and public-sector employment. Unions demand protection of real wages, preservation of health and social services funding, and guarantees against austerity measures that shift adjustment costs onto workers. Existence of dialogue with the government: The Fiscal Council recommends stronger social consultations; in practice there are sectoral contacts, but unions formally have no influence on the development of the Strategy. Measure 2: Suspension / limited application of fiscal rule on deficit (and related fiscal-rule arrangements). The Draft (and recent practice) effectively suspends strict deficit limits (the deficit rule tied to debt) until 2029, allowing higher deficits (circa 3% of GDP) in the medium term. Why it affects workers: Weak or suspended fiscal rules increase policy uncertainty: while they may temporarily protect spending, they also raise the risk of sharply delayed consolidation, which—when it arrives—often means deeper cuts to wages, pensions and services that hit workers hardest. Unions call for clear commitments to protect wages and social spending and demand transparent, socially-balanced consolidation plans if rules are reintroduced. Measure 3: IMF / external conditionality and policy coordination (Policy Coordination Instrument / fiscal conditionality). Serbia’s programmatic engagement with international partners (IMF PCI / reviews) requires fiscal discipline, PFM improvements and structural reforms (SOE governance, tax administration). IMF-oriented fiscal consolidation and structural reforms often prioritise deficit/duty reduction and SOE restructuring — which can translate into wage restraint, headcount reductions in public firms, and pressure on social transfers if adjustment is not socially-balanced. ECONOMIC measure: Adopted/under implementation Measure 1: Privatization of selected state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and social / public capital companies. The Serbian Ministry of Economy plans to privatize seven companies by 2025 (from among a larger list of ~43). These include firms like Toza Marković (Kikinda), Lastra, Progres, Bačka, Jugoinspekt, and “JAT-Apartments Kopaonik.” There is also a legal amendment setting final deadline for completing privatization by 31 December 2027, with possible bankruptcy or state takeover of assets if firms do not privatize by then. Privatization often leads to job losses, changes in working conditions, weakening of collective bargaining. Workers will lose employment security, social benefits tied to state ownership, and face wage suppression as private owners often attempt to cut costs. It will reduce labour protection if private owners impose more flexible (less secure) contracts. Also, profits may shift away from public benefit toward private profit, affecting communities and public services. Unions and worker representatives have expressed concern about job security, urged protection of employment, demanded social guarantees in privatization contracts, transparency, and involvement of workers in restructuring. They want full compensation when layoffs happen and preservation of collective agreements. Unions know that dialogue is insufficient, not all privatizations undergo full social partner consultation, and legal/operational obstacles are often used to delay or undermine meaningful worker participation. Measure 2: Labour market reform: new Labour Law, Internships, EU alignment – announced. The government has announced/restarted initiatives under a EU-financed Twinning project to reform the labour market: drafting a new Labour Law; enacting Serbia’s first Law on Internships; aligning domestic legislation with the EU acquis; strengthening consultative mechanisms with social partners. When it comes to the Labor Law, although work is underway to align it with EU directives, unions have not been invited to participate in the process, and it would be beneficial in many ways. As time goes by, something is changing in the most important law for workers, unions are not informed about the changes, they are not educated about the directives that are being incorporated into the law, and when everything is finished and the law is put on the table, it will be difficult to change anything that is already on paper. It will simply be too late. When it comes to the Law of Internships, this is the third time that it has started from scratch, since the formation of the working group. The first time was in 2021, then in 2023, and the third time now in 2025. After the formation of the Working Group for the development of this law, the first meeting was held. Trade unions, as well as other NGOs, were involved in the development of the Law. The Employers’ Union of Serbia is trying to remove the trade union from the obligation to inform and consult union representatives in the company, trying to break up unions by company, further weakening the labor movement in Serbia. The second goal is to get an extremely young workforce, aged 18-30, who will acquire skills and work for the employer for 6 months, but also opening up space for abuses by the employer. One of the possible ones is related to their benefits. Employers insist that it be an amount that will not be publicly available, nor clear to the new young worker, under the pretext that they should “negotiate their compensation with the employer”. In these negotiations, it is known who the stronger party is and that the young people will not be able to fight it out on their own. This was also the reason why the negotiations failed the previous two times. Trade unions have welcomed the promise of legal updates, but insist on explicit protections in new legislation: strong sector-level agreements, better wages, protection of collective bargaining, safeguards vs precarious work. SOCIAL measure: Adopted/under implementation Measure 1: Restraint in social spending despite high poverty and underfunded public services. The Fiscal Council has criticized the government’s 2026–2028 fiscal strategy for keeping social protection spending at a low share of GDP, despite alarming levels of poverty, demographic decline, and shortages in health, education, and social welfare systems. Wage increases in health, education and social protection lag behind inflation, and systemic underfunding persists. Chronic underinvestment undermines decent wages and working conditions in education, health and social protection. Workers face low pay, staff shortages, and work overload, while pensioners and vulnerable groups remain at risk of poverty. This erodes the value of collective agreements and discourages younger workers from entering these professions, worsening labour shortages. Trade unions consistently demand real wage growth above inflation, systemic reform of the coefficient system, higher allocations for health, education and social services, and protection of pensions from erosion. They oppose cosmetic increases that mask austerity. Formal dialogue exists (sectoral negotiations, tripartite bodies), but decisions are largely unilateral. The Unions notes lack of transparency and realism in planning; unions report their demands are ignored or only partially addressed, without genuine negotiation. Measure 2: Pension increases + decree “amount alongside pension” The Government adopted a Decree that provides a monetary supplement (increase alongside pension) for beneficiaries of old-age, early old-age, disability and family pensions from December 2024 through November 2025; average pensions also rose (e.g. 10.9% raise in December 2024). Pension increases improve income for retirees, help with cost‐of‐living pressures, particularly for workers who will retire or those with low contributions; also signal commitment to social protection. However, increases are very modest relative to inflation, they may still leave many pensioners in poverty. Pensioner / senior unions note the increase but argue it remains insufficient for a decent life. They call for stronger indexing, regular increases, better access to healthcare and social services. Decree was adopted by government; there is formal mechanism for pensions via Pension and Disability Insurance Fund, but unions claim they lack influence. Dialogue is limited. Measure 3: Salary increases / coefficients in public sector (education etc.) In response to union demands, the Government and Ministry of Education agreed to adjust salaries for employees in primary & secondary education, kindergartens, student residences, specifying increases in salary coefficients: +5% in March 2025 and +5% in October 2025 for certain qualification levels. Also resolved outstanding issues with education unions and collective agreements. Unions in education sectors welcomed the agreement but insist that coefficient structure be reviewed system-wide, that all public sector workers benefit, not just those in education, and that wages’ real value (vs inflation) be maintained. Education unions were part of negotiations; the government accepted some demands; there is formal sectoral dialogue in education. ENVIRONMENTAL measure: Adopted/under implementation Measure : Delays and underfunding of environmental and climate transition measures. The Fiscal Council criticised the Draft Fiscal Strategy 2026–2028 for ignoring the scale of investment needed for environmental protection, clean energy, and just transition. Despite EU obligations, Serbia postpones coal phase-out, delays investments in wastewater, waste management and air quality, and maintains energy subsidies instead of financing sustainable reforms. Delays in transition jeopardise workers in both coal/energy sectors and in communities suffering from pollution. Instead of planned retraining and green job creation, workers face job insecurity, health risks, and stagnant wages. Underfunded green policies shift the costs of pollution and climate damage to workers and households, while businesses are spared stricter obligations. Unions and NGOs demand urgent investment in just transition, retraining, and stable financing for environmental infrastructure. They oppose cost-shifting to households and insist on protecting employment and health standards in the transition. Consultations on climate and environmental plans exist formally but are superficial. The government avoids transparent budgeting for green transition. Unions report their proposals are ignored, with decisions made unilaterally. SWITZERLAND (Travail.Suisse) BUDGETARY/FISCAL measure: Planned/announced Since 2023, Switzerland has a strict debt brake that significantly limits investment opportunities. In addition, the Federal Council (government) has recently presented a ‘financial relief programme’ to save 2.4 billion in 2027 and 3 billion in each of 2028 and 2029 (and beyond). It includes numerous cuts in the public services, environmental and education sectors. It focuses almost exclusively on expenditure, with hardly any new revenue planned. Austerity measures are also planned in various cantons (Vaud, Fribourg, etc.), which play a major role in Switzerland’s federalist system. The ‘financial relief programme’ is now with Parliament. However, no major changes are expected. If the optional referendum is seized, the package must then be approved in a referendum. Travail.Suisse has been extremely critical of the austerity package during the official consultation process and rejects it in its entirety. This was also communicated to the government at various meetings. Travail.Suisse considers it completely counterproductive to make savings in the areas of education, public services and climate policy, which Travail.Suisse regards as fundamental to securing prosperity and quality of life. Travail.Suisse sees the answer to the financial challenges more on the revenue side than on the expenditure side. ECONOMIC measure: Planned/announced The Federal Council recently announced that it intends to reduce the administrative burden on businesses and review existing regulations. It has identified four areas of regulation in which opportunities for reduction are to be examined. These are public procurement, pharmaceutical regulation, the right to appeal against construction projects and the regulation of industrial enterprises. The Federal Council will decide on the next steps and specific relief measures in the coming year. The impact of the planned deregulation on employees cannot yet be assessed, as the exact measures are not yet known. However, Travail.Suisse will fight to ensure that measures are only taken where they are reasonable and justifiable and do not come at the expense of employees. SOCIAL measure: Planned/announced The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has ruled that Switzerland does not treat widowed persons equally. Widowers receive lower pension benefits than widows. Instead of adjusting the pensions of widowers and widows to the higher pension, the survivor’s pension is being adjusted downwards in the current parliamentary process. One of the reasons given for this downward adjustment is the financial situation of the federal government. The planned measures would increase the risk of poverty in retirement and among families, and would hit hardest those who were unable to earn high incomes during their working lives due to care responsibilities, traditional gender roles or low-paid work. Travail.Suisse has resolutely opposed any plans to cut survivor’s pensions, both during the consultation process and in the current parliamentary process. ENVIRONMENTAL measure: Planned/announced The austerity measures envisaged in the “financial relief programme” also affect the environmental area. For example, subsidies for climate policy that have already been approved will be prioritised, which – as the Federal Council writes in its message to Parliament – could reduce Switzerland’s contribution to combating climate change. Travail.Suisse has been extremely critical of the austerity package during the official consultation process and rejects it in its entirety. This was also communicated to the government at various meetings. ————————————————————————————— (SGB-USS / Swiss Trade Union Confederation) BUDGETARY/FISCAL measures: Adopted/under implementation Step-wise spending cut in the national yearly budget as well as, on top, an overall large-scale austerity package currently in parliamentary discussion. A budgetary rule (“spending brake”) has been in place on both federal and cantonal levels for around almost 20 years.
